Some good additions!

(1)

Naturalism is just a sub-category of moral objectivism. Once you’ve gotten to moral objectivism, you can again ask the question, “What determines the truth of a moral claim?” If your answer is “features of the world that are reducible to non-moral features (eg: physical features of the world)” then you’re a naturalist, rather than a garden-variety objectivist who typically relies on non-physical things to ground moral truths.

Ideal observer theory can be stuck alongside subjectivism, relativism, and divine command theory (they all share the assumption that moral claims are truth-apt, etc.) though the “mind” which grounds morality for the ideal observer theorist is only a counterfactual mind.

I think of expressivism as basically identical to emotivism. (Expressivism is maybe intended to incorporate a broader range of attitudes than emotivism, which only deals with “emotions”, but I feel like that distinction isn’t super important.) This is thoroughly in the realm of non-cognitivism, and I’m struggling to find a short summary of “cognitivist expressivism.” Can you link/write one for me?

Would you agree that quasi-realism is a subcategory of emotivism which just says that in addition to expressing emotion, moral claims express emotion as if there was something external/“real” about them?

(2)

Awesome! I skimmed it. Seems like it maps well to the position I described. And it brings up a nice little edit—traditional non-cognitivism does include an assumption that moral claims are expressing something going on in the mind, something which is not belief-like (typically imperative feelings or emotions, as you know). So if you’re actually hardcore about saying that moral claims are nonsense, you don’t want to be included in that category. You want to say that moral claims refer to nothing at all. So in order to include this position in the graph, we’d actually have to add an additional question up on top; in addition to asking about truth-apt-ness, we’ll have to ask about whether you think moral claims refer to anything at all. First question: “do moral claims make any sort of sense?” if you say no, you’re incoherentist. If you say yes, you move on to the rest of the flowchart. Would you agree with that assessment? As he says here: “But moral incoherentism is in a crucial respect very much unlike the error theory, for it denies that moral utterances are factual assertions. Thus it makes more sense to treat it as an entirely new variety of moral irrealism. Traditionally, moral irrealists have been forced to choose between non-cognitivism and the error theory (leaving aside relativism and subjectivism, anti-objectivist theories which may or may not be thought of as versions of moral realism). Moral incoherentism is a form of moral irrealism that denies the semantic assumptions behind both of the traditional forms.”

(3)

“people judge some instances as moral realists of one or another kind, and others as some kind of antirealist (e.g. as noncognitivists). If so, it may be that many of us are metaethical pluralists with a “mixed” metaethical position” Yea, I think this is definitely right.

(4)

“It might be that we sometimes use moral language in a prescriptive way, and at other times in some noncognitive rhetorical way, and at other times to assert mind-independent facts, etc. … This is why we might be metaethical pluralists, even if this isn’t obvious to us.” Yep! Great point. Variation within people as well as between.